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1
 
 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE – SETTLEMENT MODIFICATIONS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court considered a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging a 
district court order approving compromise of a minor’s medical practice claim, but directing a 
different settlement distribution than agreed to by the parties. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court denied the writ petition in part because NRS 41.200
2
 authorized the district 
court to adjust the allocation of settlement fees and costs in the minor’s best interest. However, 
the court granted the petition in part because the district court did not explain its allocation of 
fees between the minor’s attorney and guardian ad litem.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 As a result of an emergency delivery procedure at the University Medical Center of 
Southern Nevada (UMC) in June 2005, Warren West’s pregnant wife died and his daughter 
Ashley was born with severe brain damage. Petitioner attorney Christopher Gellner brought 
wrongful death and personal injury claims against Dr. Joel Orevillo and Stewart Pulmonary 
Associates, Ltd. (SPA). When Ashley was subsequently adopted, Petitioner Dale Haley was 
appointed as her guardian ad litem. 
 
 The parties reached a $283,000 settlement in July 2010.  The parties submitted a 
proposed compromise to the district court to approve allocation of $109,187.26 to Gellner, 
$20,100 to Haley, $79,333.33 to Medicaid, and the remaining $29,379.41 to Ashley. The district 
court refused to approve the compromise because the attorney allocation exceeded the amount 
for the minor.  After reviewing Haley’s statement of hours and Gellner’s retainer agreement, the 
district court allotted $95,200 to Ashley and $63,466.67 as fees and costs to Gellner and Haley 
combined. 
 
 Gellner and Haley sought the Court’s intervention by extraordinary writ, asserting the 
district court lacked the statutory authority to unilaterally alter the distribution, and even if it had 
such authority, the district court abused its discretion in making the alteration. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Parraguirre wrote for the unanimous three justice panel,
3
 noting that writ relief 
was appropriate because the petitioners had no right of appeal as neither was an aggrieved party. 
                                                        
1 By Amanda Ireland. 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. 41.200 (2007)(governing compromise of a minor’s claim). 
3 Justice Parraguirre was joined by Justices Douglas and Hardesty. 
Further, the petition presented an issue of first impression whether a district court has authority 
to unilaterally alter distribution of a settlement when approving compromise of a minor’s claim. 
 
 Petitioners argued that NRS 41.200 merely afforded the district court narrow authority to 
approve a compromise in its entirety, and not to determine the amount a minor would receive. 
The Court disagreed, finding that NRS 41.200 granted broad authority to approve the proposed 
compromise of a minor’s claim because the approval process expressly encompassed review of 
the proposed apportionment of proceeds, including the proposed allocation of attorney fees and 
other expenses.
4
 Further, NRCP 17(c) allowed the district court to issue any order it deemed 
proper to protect a minor, a rule almost identical to FRCP 17(c) charging the court with a 
“special duty . . . to safeguard the interests of litigants who are minors.”5  
 
 The Court was guided by the Fourth Circuit, which concluded that “ascertaining whether 
attorney fee agreements involving minors . . . are reasonable” was integral to the protective 
judicial role.
6
  Such review necessarily entailed authority to review each portion of the proposed 
compromise for reasonableness and to adjust the terms of the settlement accordingly, including 
the fees and costs to be taken from the minor’s recovery.7  
 
 Next, the Court considered Ashley’s proposed compromise and reallocation of fees, 
applying a “fair and reasonable” approach to review a settlement involving minors. The Court 
concluded the district court acted within its broad discretion in finding the proposed allocation to 
Gellner to be unreasonable. The district court had appropriately applied the Brunzell factors to 
calculate the reasonableness of attorney fees.
8
 This analysis noted Gellner’s limited experience 
as a medical malpractice attorney and highlighted his role in complicating the case with many 
amended motions, dismissals and time-barred complaints due to attorney oversight. Finally, the 
district court had balanced Ashley’s lifelong special needs and potential for a multimillion dollar 
judgment against the proposed payment. Writ relief was therefore denied on this part. 
 
 However, the Court found the reallocation was problematic when it combined Gellner’s 
and Haley’s recovery, instead of separating out the fees for the guardian ad litem, who was 
statutorily entitled to reasonable compensation.
9
 The Court granted mandamus relief in this 
respect, with the district court instructed to provide a distribution of the $63,466.67 that 
reasonably accounted for the duties performed by Gellner as attorney and Haley ad guardian ad 
litem. 
 
Conclusion 
  
 NRS 41.200 authorized the district court to modify the proposed compromise in the 
minor’s best interest, so redistribution of the settlement proceeds was proper. However, the 
                                                        
4 NEV. REV. STAT. 41.200(2)(f). 
5 See Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2011). 
6 In re Abrams & Abrams, P.A., 605 F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 2010). 
7 Id. at 244. 
8 Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969)(“(1) the qualities of the 
attorney; (2) the character of the work to be done; (3) the actual work performed by the attorney; and (4) the 
case’s result.”) 
9 NEV. REV. STAT.  159.0455(1). 
district court should have provided an explanation as to the allocation of fees between the 
attorney and guardian ad litem. 
